ISO 27001 Control A.5.23: Information Security for Use of Cloud Services
Almost every organization we work with runs on the cloud now, often without anyone having decided to. A team signs up for a project tool, someone connects a storage service to the CRM, and a year later the company’s most sensitive data lives in half a dozen places that nobody has formally approved. A.5.23 is the control that turns that drift into a decision. It is the 23rd of 37 organizational controls in our walk through Annex A, and one of the newer additions in the 2022 revision.
The control is not about whether the cloud is safe. It is about whether you chose your cloud services deliberately, know who is responsible for what, and can leave if you have to. A provider with excellent security still leaves you holding the risk if you misconfigure a storage bucket or cannot get your data back when the contract ends.
What the control requires
Annex A control 5.23 of ISO 27001:2022 states that processes for acquisition, use, management and exit from cloud services shall be established in accordance with the organization’s information security requirements.
The key elements:
- Processes - repeatable ways of working, not a one-off decision about a single provider
- Acquisition, use, management and exit - the whole life cycle of a cloud service, from choosing it to leaving it
- In accordance with the organization’s information security requirements - your own risk appetite, legal duties and customer commitments decide what is acceptable
A.5.23 is a preventive control. Annex A states the control; ISO/IEC 27002:2022 gives the guidance, including the idea that cloud security is a shared responsibility between you and the provider, and that the split should be written down. The guidance also points to the ISO/IEC 27017 family for cloud-specific detail, which we cover in our guide to ISO 27017.
How to implement information security for cloud services
Write a cloud policy people can follow
Start with a short topic-specific rule set: which kinds of information may go into which kinds of cloud service, who can approve a new service, and what minimum security a provider must show. Tie the answer to your classification of information. Public marketing material can sit almost anywhere; client data, source code or personal data needs a provider you have properly assessed.
Keep the approval route light enough that people use it. If getting a new tool approved takes six weeks, teams will simply skip the process. A one-page request form and a named reviewer, with a promise to answer within a few days, works better than a long policy nobody reads.
Define who is responsible for what
Every cloud service splits duties between you and the provider, and the split differs between infrastructure, platform and software services. For each service in scope, write down who handles:
- Physical and infrastructure security, usually the provider
- Identity and access, including multi-factor authentication and joiner-mover-leaver processes, usually you
- Configuration of the service, such as sharing settings, network rules and logging, usually you
- Backups and data recovery, which varies and is often misunderstood
- Incident notification, including how fast the provider tells you and how you tell them
A simple responsibility matrix per major service is enough. It also gives you something concrete to take into supplier conversations, which is where information security in supplier relationships and addressing information security within supplier agreements come in.
Assess providers and manage them over time
Before you sign, look at what the provider can show you: independent audit reports, certifications, data location options, encryption features, logging, and how they handle subprocessors. We would treat a certificate as a useful starting point rather than proof that your particular use is safe, because the scope of a certificate may not cover the exact service you use. After you sign, keep watching. Follow the practices in monitoring, review and change management of supplier services: review reports each year, track service changes, and read the notices your provider sends about new features and retired ones.
Many cloud services depend on other providers further down the chain. Managing information security in the ICT supply chain covers that part, and it is worth asking your key providers which subprocessors they rely on.
Plan the exit before you need it
Exit is the element most organizations skip. Before you commit, ask how you would get your data out, in what format, how quickly, and how you would confirm that the provider deleted what remains. Check the contract for termination assistance, data return periods and deletion commitments. For critical services, think about what happens if the provider fails suddenly or changes terms: could you run on a different service, even slowly?
You do not need a full migration plan for every tool. A short exit note per important service, covering data export, dependencies and a realistic time estimate, is a good standard. Revisit it when the service changes materially.
The records that satisfy this control are mostly things you create anyway: the approval of a new service, the provider review, the responsibility matrix and the exit note. Store them next to the supplier file so that one search finds everything about a provider. When a service changes in a meaningful way, such as a new data region, a new subprocessor or a pricing model that pushes teams towards cheaper tiers with fewer security features, add a dated line to the record. Over a year, that trail shows an auditor that the process is alive rather than a document written the week before the visit. It also helps you in practice: when a customer sends a security questionnaire asking where their data lives, you can answer in minutes instead of days. Where personal data is involved, involve whoever handles privacy early, since transfers and processor terms depend on your jurisdictions and are best confirmed with qualified advice. Our post on ISO 27001 and GDPR gives the wider picture.
Related controls and clauses
A.5.9 connection. The inventory of information and other associated assets should list your cloud services and the information held in them. You cannot govern services you do not know about.
A.5.12 connection. Classification of information tells you what may go into which service.
A.5.19 to A.5.22 connection. The supplier controls, from information security in supplier relationships to monitoring, review and change management of supplier services, apply to cloud providers just as they do to any other supplier. A.5.23 adds the cloud-specific view.
A.5.15 connection. Access control and identity management decide who can log in to each service; in the cloud, identity is often the main perimeter.
Clause 4.2 connection. Understanding the needs and expectations of interested parties include customers and regulators whose requirements may limit where data can be stored or processed.
Clause 8.3 connection. Information security risk treatment is where decisions about cloud providers and their residual risks are recorded.
Forward reference. Later in the series we cover incident management planning (A.5.24), ICT readiness for business continuity (A.5.30) and, among the technological controls, information backup and use of cryptography, all of which matter for cloud-hosted data.
What auditors check
A cloud policy or procedure. Auditors expect to see documented rules for acquiring and using cloud services and to hear staff describe the same approach.
A list of services in use. They compare your register with reality, sometimes by asking a team which tools they use and checking whether those appear on your list.
Responsibility split. For key services, they look for a clear statement of what you manage and what the provider manages.
Provider assessment evidence. Expect requests for due diligence records, reviewed audit reports and contracts for important providers.
Configuration and access. An auditor may ask to see sharing settings, multi-factor authentication status and administrator accounts in a major service.
Exit arrangements. They ask what happens to your data if you leave, and whether anyone has checked that the answer is true.
Common mistakes to avoid
Shadow IT. Teams adopt services without review. A simple discovery exercise, such as checking expense claims and single sign-on logs, often turns up surprises.
Assuming the provider handles everything. Most cloud incidents involve customer-side configuration. The provider secures the platform; you secure how you use it.
Treating a certificate as the whole assessment. Check that the certificate scope covers the service and region you actually use.
No exit plan. Lock-in becomes a security problem the day a provider changes its terms, raises prices sharply or suffers a major outage.
Forgetting small tools. The risk is not limited to the big platforms. A free converter website that receives client documents is a cloud service too.
Unmanaged administrator accounts. Shared admin logins and accounts of people who left the company are an everyday finding in cloud reviews.
How 27kay can help
We help organizations bring their cloud use under control without slowing teams down. As part of ISO 27001 implementation, we build a practical cloud register, help you define the responsibility split for your main services, and prepare the evidence an auditor will ask for. For the full picture, see our ISO 27001 knowledge hub.
If we asked your teams to list every cloud service holding company data today, would the list match the one in your register? Get in touch - we will help you find out, and fix the gaps without the drama.