ISO 27001 Control A.5.16: Identity Management

· 8 min read · Lyudmil Arkov

Before a system can decide what someone is allowed to do, it has to know who that someone is. Identity management is the discipline of creating, maintaining and retiring the identities that everything else relies on. Get it right and access control is straightforward. Get it wrong and you end up with accounts for people who left two years ago, accounts nobody can explain and activity in logs that cannot be tied to anyone. A.5.16 is the 16th of 37 organizational controls in our walk through Annex A.

The wording of the control is short, and the scope is wide. It covers people, but also service accounts, devices and anything else that authenticates to your systems. The key word is life cycle: an identity is born, it changes, and it must eventually end.

What the control requires

Annex A control 5.16 of ISO 27001:2022 states that the full life cycle of identities shall be managed.

The key elements:

  • Identities - the representation of a person, a group, a device or a service in your systems, so more than staff user accounts
  • Full life cycle - creation, verification, changes, suspension and eventual removal, not just the first step
  • Managed - a defined process with owners and records, rather than whoever happens to have admin rights doing it ad hoc

A.5.16 is a preventive control in ISO/IEC 27002:2022. Annex A states the control; ISO 27002 gives guidance, including that identities should be unique so that actions can be traced to an individual, that shared identities should be used only where necessary and approved, and that disabled or removed identities should not be reassigned to someone else. It also highlights that information needed to set up identities, such as authoritative data from HR, should be reliable and kept current.

How to implement identity management

Give every identity a unique owner

Each identity should map to exactly one person, device or service, and each should have a named owner who can say why it exists. Unique identities are what make logging useful: when you review activity, you want to know who did something, not that “the admin account” did it. This links directly to the access rules you set under access control, because rules about who can do what only mean something if you can tell people apart.

Shared accounts are the usual exception. Sometimes a shared login is unavoidable, for example with a legacy tool or a social media account. Treat these as approved exceptions: record the owner, record who can use it, limit what it can do and add compensating controls such as vaulted credentials and session logging.

Run joiners, movers and leavers as a process

The life cycle has three recurring events, and each needs a trigger and an owner:

  • Joiners - an identity is created after the hiring decision and after the checks described under screening, with access limited to what the role needs
  • Movers - when someone changes role, their identity stays, but access is reviewed and old permissions are removed instead of simply adding new ones
  • Leavers - identities are disabled at the agreed time, and the related steps in responsibilities after termination or change of employment and return of assets are completed

The most reliable trigger is HR. If your HR system or process is the source of truth for who works for you, create the link between it and your identity system, even if it is only a checklist and a ticket. The failure we see most often is a leaver process that depends on a manager remembering to send an email.

Include contractors, suppliers and non-human identities

Contractors and supplier staff need identities too, usually with an end date. Set an expiry when the account is created and require a sponsor within your organization to renew it. For non-human identities such as service accounts, API keys and automation users, keep a register: what it is, what it can access, who owns it and when its credentials were last rotated. These accounts often outlive the project that created them and hold powerful access, which makes them a favorite for attackers and a common audit surprise.

If you use a central directory or single sign-on service, bring as many applications as possible under it. Every application with its own user list is a place where an identity can be forgotten at leaving time.

Verify, record and review

Decide how you confirm a person is who they claim to be when an identity is created or when a request to change it arrives. A request for a password reset or new device from a “colleague” by chat is a classic social engineering route, so define the checks. Keep records of creation, change and removal, because they are your evidence. Finally, review the list of identities at regular intervals against HR data, looking for accounts with no owner, accounts that have not been used for a long time and duplicates. Inactive accounts can be suspended first and deleted later, which keeps a safety margin.

Keep it proportionate

A five-person startup does not need an identity governance platform. It needs a list of systems, an owner for each, and a checklist that someone actually runs when a person joins or leaves. A larger organization will lean on a directory and automation, but the principle is identical: know every identity, know who is responsible for it, and have a reliable way to end it.

Start small. List your ten most important systems, check who has accounts in each, and compare that list with the people who currently work for you. The first comparison almost always reveals a few surprises, such as an ex-contractor still invited to a repository or a test account with admin rights. Fixing those is a quick win, and it gives you a concrete example to show leadership why the process deserves a little ongoing attention.

Document what you decide in a page rather than a manual, and make sure the people who run the process, usually IT and HR, have both read it.

A.5.15 connection. Access control defines the rules that identities are used to enforce.

A.6.1 connection. Screening happens before an identity is issued to a new employee.

A.6.5 connection. Responsibilities after termination or change of employment covers what is still expected of someone once the identity is closed.

A.5.11 connection. Return of assets runs alongside identity removal in the leaver process.

A.5.9 connection. The inventory of information and other associated assets helps you find the systems whose user lists you need to manage.

A.6.2 connection. Terms and conditions of employment set the contractual expectations that the identity process supports.

Forward reference. Authentication information (A.5.17) and access rights (A.5.18) follow in the next two posts, and the technological controls on secure authentication and privileged access come later in the series.

What auditors check

A defined life cycle process. Auditors look for a documented procedure covering creation, change, suspension and removal, and for named owners.

Leaver sampling. A very common test: they take a list of people who left recently and check that their accounts were disabled promptly across all systems, not just the main directory.

Unique identities. They look for shared or generic accounts and ask for the approval, owner and compensating controls for each.

Third-party and service accounts. Expect questions about contractor accounts, expiry dates and the register of service accounts.

Link to HR. They ask how the identity process learns about joiners, movers and leavers, and test whether it works with real examples.

Reviews. Evidence of periodic identity reviews, including action taken on orphaned or inactive accounts, shows the control is operated.

Common mistakes to avoid

Disabling only the main account. Leavers keep access through a forgotten SaaS login or a personal admin token. Know where your identities live.

Manager-dependent offboarding. A process that relies on someone remembering to send an email will fail at the worst moment. Make HR the trigger.

Reusing identities. Giving a former employee’s account name to a newcomer breaks the audit trail and can leak old permissions.

No end date for contractors. Accounts that were meant for a three-month project and are still active two years later are an easy finding.

Ignoring non-human identities. Service accounts and API keys carry real power and rarely appear on any list. Register them.

Treating movers as an add-only event. People who change role should lose the access they no longer need. Otherwise permissions accumulate over time.

How 27kay can help

We help organizations bring their identities under control without buying a large tool first. As part of ISO 27001 implementation, we map where identities live, design a practical joiners, movers and leavers process that fits your team, and prepare the evidence an auditor will ask for. For the full picture, see our ISO 27001 knowledge hub.

If someone left your company last month, could you show that every one of their accounts is gone? Get in touch - we will help you find out in a friendly, no-pressure way.