ISO 27001 Control A.5.25: Assessment and Decision on Information Security Events
Every organization sees odd things: a failed login from another country, a colleague who mentions a suspicious email, an alert from a security tool at 2am. Most of them turn out to be nothing. A few turn out to be the start of something serious. The skill is telling the difference quickly and consistently, and that is what A.5.25 is about. It is the 25th of 37 organizational controls in our walk through Annex A, and the second step in the incident life cycle after planning.
Without a clear way to assess events, two things go wrong. Either everything is treated as an emergency and the team burns out, or everything is waved through and a real incident sits in someone’s inbox for a week. A simple, shared triage method avoids both.
What the control requires
Annex A control 5.25 of ISO 27001:2022 states that the organization shall assess information security events and decide if they are to be categorized as information security incidents.
The key elements:
- Assess - look at what happened, what it affects and how serious it could be
- Information security events - any observed occurrence that might indicate a breach or control failure, reported by people or detected by tools
- Decide - a clear outcome for each event: it is an incident, or it is not
- Categorized - incidents are classified so that the response matches the seriousness
A.5.25 is a detective control in the attributes of ISO/IEC 27002:2022. Annex A states the control; ISO 27002 gives guidance, including the use of an agreed classification scale for the effect and priority of incidents and the idea that the assessment should be recorded for later review. The distinction between an event and an incident is the heart of it: an event is something that happened, an incident is an event that has, or could have, a real impact on confidentiality, integrity or availability.
How to implement event assessment
Define a simple classification scale
Agree a small scale that anyone on the response team can apply in minutes. Three or four levels are usually enough. Define each by impact, not by gut feeling. For example, a high level might apply when personal data or client confidential information is involved, a critical service is unavailable, or an attacker has gained privileged access. A low level might apply to a blocked phishing attempt that nobody clicked on.
Write a couple of examples next to each level. Examples teach faster than definitions, and they keep the scale consistent between different people and different shifts. Link the scale to your classification of information, because the sensitivity of the affected data is one of the strongest signals of severity.
Build a triage routine
For every reported event, someone should work through the same questions:
- What exactly was observed, when, and by whom or by which tool?
- Which systems, accounts, data and people are affected?
- Is it still happening, or has it stopped?
- Could this be a symptom of something larger, for example one compromised account used to reach others?
- Does any legal, contractual or customer notification clock start because of it?
Record the answers, the category assigned and the name of the person who made the decision. If the answer is “not an incident”, record why. That entry matters later, because a pattern of small events sometimes only becomes visible when you look back.
Where you use monitoring tools, tune the alerts so that the team looks at meaningful ones. A queue full of unreviewed alerts is a quiet risk of its own. This ties into the monitoring controls we cover later in the technological section of Annex A.
Make sure the right person decides
The person who takes the first report is rarely the person who should decide. Define who makes the call, who they consult, and what authority they have. In a small organization, this may be one security lead with a named deputy. In a larger one, there may be a first-line service desk that escalates to a specialist. Whichever you choose, confirm that people can reach the decision-maker outside office hours when the event is serious.
Define escalation triggers too. Certain events should always go straight to a senior person: suspected data theft, ransomware, compromise of administrator accounts, or anything involving client data. Decide these in advance, using the roles from your information security incident management planning and preparation, so nobody has to wonder whether to disturb management.
Feed the assessment with context
Good decisions use context. Pair your triage with what you know about current threats, for example through threat intelligence, and with what the business is doing: a login from a new country is less alarming when the sales director is travelling. Keep a short record of known benign patterns such as scheduled scans, penetration tests and maintenance windows so that the team does not treat each as a fresh mystery. Review the classifications from time to time. If most events labelled high turn out to be harmless, your scale is too sensitive; if serious ones were first labelled low, it is too lax.
Create one register for all events, whatever their outcome, with a unique reference for each. A spreadsheet or ticket queue is perfectly acceptable. Capture the date and time of the report, the source, a short description, the category chosen, the decision maker, and the outcome. Add links to the response record when the event becomes an incident. This register gives you three benefits at once. It proves to an auditor that the control operates. It lets you spot repeat patterns, such as the same department reporting similar phishing messages every week. And it supplies the numbers for your management review, such as how many events were reported, how many became incidents and how long assessment took, which feeds the monitoring you do under monitoring, measurement, analysis and evaluation. Keep entries factual and free of blame, because people report more readily when they trust that a mistake will be treated as a learning opportunity rather than a trial.
Related controls and clauses
A.5.24 connection. Information security incident management planning and preparation sets up the process and roles that this triage step uses.
A.6.8 connection. Information security event reporting is where events arrive from; the quality of reporting decides the quality of assessment.
A.5.7 connection. Threat intelligence gives the context needed to judge whether an event is routine or significant.
A.5.12 connection. Classification of information helps you judge the severity when data is involved.
Clause 8.2 connection. Information security risk assessment provides the impact and likelihood thinking that your event scale should reflect.
Forward reference. What happens after a decision is covered in response to information security incidents (A.5.26) and learning from information security incidents (A.5.27). Preserving proof is covered in collection of evidence (A.5.28). Those posts follow shortly.
What auditors check
A defined scale. Auditors look for a documented classification or priority scheme and ask staff how they apply it.
Records of decisions. They sample past events, including ones judged not to be incidents, and check that the reasoning was written down.
Consistency. Two similar events should have received similar treatment. Auditors compare examples to see whether the scheme works in practice.
Timeliness. They look at how long events waited before being assessed and whether urgent ones were handled promptly.
Competence. Interviews with the people who triage show whether they understand the categories and know when to escalate.
Links to the rest of the process. They expect evidence that events categorized as incidents moved into the response process and that closed items are reviewed.
Common mistakes to avoid
No distinction between event and incident. If every report is an incident, the process drowns; if none are, real problems go unmanaged.
Verbal decisions only. If the assessment is not written down, it cannot be reviewed or defended later.
Triage by whoever happens to be online. Without defined authority, decisions vary wildly in quality.
Ignoring low-level events. Repeated small events can reveal a trend. Review them periodically instead of closing and forgetting.
An overly complicated scale. A ten-level scoring system that nobody can apply under pressure is worse than three clear levels.
Missing the notification clock. Some events trigger legal or contractual deadlines from the moment you become aware. Check the rules that apply to you and build the question into the triage routine.
How 27kay can help
We help organizations create triage methods that real teams use under pressure. As part of ISO 27001 implementation, we help you define a sensible classification scale, set up the records and run exercises to test the decisions. For the full picture, see our ISO 27001 knowledge hub.
When a strange alert arrives late on a Friday, does your team know how to decide whether it is a real incident? Get in touch - we will help you build a method that makes that call easy and defensible.